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clusionary rule was formulated in order to discourage police from engaging in
searches in the absence of probable cause. By ruling that evidence so obtained
could not be admitted at a trial against the person from whom it was seized,
the Supreme Court effectively curtailed such police conduct. Similarly, if the
courts, where a search pursuant to section 180-a is involved, were to limit the
objects which could be admitted into evidence to weapons only, as Judge Van
Voorhis suggested,6 2 they would eliminate much of the incentive to misuse the
powers granted by the statute. Without this limitation, the fourth amendment
will be denied effect.
63
HARvEY M. PULLMAN
EVIDENCE-MEDrA. TREATISES To BE ADMITTED AS INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION TO TnE HEARSAY Rury.
Plaintiff and defendant were the drivers of two automobiles involved in an
accident. As a result of the accident, an operation known as ankylosis had to be
performed on the plaintiff at which time two ruptured discs from his spine were
removed and the vertebrae fused together with bone from the hip. The plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages for the personal injuries sustained. At the
trial, plaintiff's medical expert testified on direct examination that in his opinion
the operation resulted in a permanent twenty per cent impairment of the spine
and ten per cent disability of the whole body generally. On cross examination,
plaintiff's expert was asked if he were familiar with the American Medical Asso-
ciation's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the Extremities
and Back.1 He replied in the affirmative, but that he had not consulted the Guide
in making his own estimate of the disability and that he was not familiar with
what the Guide set for the operation. Defense counsel then asked his own medical
expert if he knew what standard of disability the Guide set for ankylosis of two
vertebrae. Plaintiff's objection to this question was sustained on the ground that
to admit the contents of the Guide directly would violate the hearsay rule, and
since plaintiff's medical expert testified that he had not consulted the Guide in
making his estimate of disability, the proper basis for admitting the contents of
the Guide to impeach plaintiff's expert did not exist. There was a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff on the negligence issue and the defendant appealed, assign-
ing the trial court's refusal to allow defendant's expert to answer the disputed
question as one source of error. Held, by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it was
62. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y. at 344, 229 N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (con-
curring opinion of Van Voorhis, J.).
63. Silver Rome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
1. JAM.A. (spec. ed. Feb. 15, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Guide]. The Guide, a collec-
tion of percentage disability tables based on objective measurements of restriction of motion,
sets limits of 3 to 7 per cent spinal impairment and 2 to 4 per cent overall bodily impairment
for ankylosis of any two cervical vertebrae. Guide 89, 103.
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not error to refuse to admit the contents of the Guide under the established rule
of law in that state.2 For the future, however, the court held that "[a] published
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art" should be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule "to prove the truth of a matter
stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject
testifies, that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the
subject."3 Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146
N.W.2d 505 (1966).
The rule followed in the overwhelming majority of states is that learned
treatises on subjects of inductive sciences, such as medicine, are inadmissible as
substantive evidence to prove the truth of statements contained therein.4 The
primary reason they are held not to be admissible is that they are hearsay, i.e.,
they are comprised of statements made out of court which are offered testimoni-
ally by someone other than the declarant to prove the truth of those statements. 5
The reason hearsay is not admissible is that the declarant of the extra-judicial
testimonial assertion is not present in the courtroom and therefore not available
for cross examination, which is considered to be the best method of exposing
weaknesses and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness.0 Thus, the hearsay
rule does not allow the bare, untested assertions of a learned treatise to be ad-
mitted in evidence to prove the truth of those assertions because the absent
author cannot be questioned regarding the methods and reasoning employed by
him in reaching his conclusions.7 Aside from this argument, which is directed
toward the hearsay nature of learned treatises, there are other objections which
are raised against admitting learned treatises.8 Among them is the fear that the
2. Prior to the principal case, the Wisconsin rule had long been that a medical book was
not admissible as independent, primary evidence because of its hearsay nature, Waterman v.
Chicago & Alton R.R., 82 Wis. 613, 52 N.W. 247 (1892), and could be used during cross-
examination only to test the qualifications of a medical expert or impeach him if he based
his opinion on that particular book or stated what it contained, City of Ripon v. Bittel,
30 Wis. 614 (1872).
3. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(31), 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 591, 640 (1965). Model
Code of Evidence, r. 529A is substantially the same but requires that the author of the work
be recognized as authoritative rather than the work itself. While three jurisdictions have
adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence, none have adopted the Model Code of Evidence.
See infra note 27.
4. See, e.g., United States v. One Device, 160 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1947); Rice v.
Clement, 184 So. 2d 678 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1966); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 2d 431,
392 P.2d 317 (1964). See generally C. McCormick, Evidence § 296 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as McCormick]; 3 B. Jones, Evidence § 621 (5th ed. 1958); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1691
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 6 Wigmore]; Annot., Medical Books or Treatises as
Independent Evidence, 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930), supplemented by 84 A.L.R.2d 1388 (1962).
Learned treatises on subjects of so-called "exact sciences" such as mathematics and chemistry,
however, are generally held to be admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Two Cases of Chloro
Naptholeum Disinfectant, 217 F. 477 (D. Md. 1914) (chemistry book); Rosche v. McCoy,
397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959) (mortality table).
5. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1361 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 5 Wigmore];
McCormick § 225; 2 B. Jones, Evidence § 268 (5th ed. 1958).
6. 5 Wigmore § 1362; MVfcCormick § 224; 2 B. Jones, Evidence § 269 (5th ed. 1958).
7. See Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950).
8. See 6 Wigmore § 1690; McCormick § 296; Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in
Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 455; Note, Learned Treatises, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 463 (1961).
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technical language of specialized publications will, without explanation, tend to
confuse the jury. Another asserts that since one can almost always find an author-
itative treatise to support one's position, the trial is likely to become little more
than a "battle of the books." Furthermore, it is argued that in a rapidly devel-
oping field of science, such as medicine, that which was accepted as authoritative
yesterday may be outdated today. Finally, it is alleged that scientific treatises
may not be based entirely on the personal observation and experience of the
author, and to the extent they are based on another's work they raise a multiple
hearsay problem.
The courts have been more permissive in allowing the use of learned treatises
on cross examination.9 They may be used for the purpose of impeaching an expert
witness whose opinion, assuming that one qualification of an expert is a knowl-
edge of the literature in his field, must necessarily depend to some extent on that
literature. When treatises are used for this purpose, the hearsay rule is not
violated because, in theory at least, they are not being offered as substantive
evidence but rather as an attack on the expert's opinion by reference to sources
the same as or similar to those from which it is drawn. The ever present fear, of
course, is that the jury, notwithstanding a special instruction from the judge,
may not grasp the distinction between the use of a treatise as substantive evi-
dence and its use in impeaching an expert and thus the hearsay rule may be
circumvented. The circumstances under which learned treatises may be used in
impeaching an expert vary greatly from state to state and reflect how strong each
state's policy is against admitting them as direct evidence, i.e., how determined
it is to see that the hearsay rule is not circumvented by the use of treatises in
cross-examination. In some states, including Wisconsin (prior to the instant
case),'° a learned treatise may be used in impeaching an expert only when he has
testified that he specifically relied on that treatise in forming his opinion.'1 This
is the purest form of impeachment--comparison with the specific source which
the expert has held out as supporting his opinion. This rule reflects a very strong
policy against admitting treatises as substantive evidence because if the expert's
reliance on the treatise is justified, it allows no more to get before the jury than
what was put before it by the expert's testimony on direct examination. If his
reliance is not justified, however, then this rule allows an opinion expressed by
the treatise, different from the expert's, to be put before the jury. Even though
the opinion of the treatise is apt to be taken to some extent as substantive evi-
dence by the jury, fundamental fairness requires that the impeaching party be
entitled to bring this difference out. While all states permit impeachment of an
9. See generally 6 Wigmore § 1700; Willens, Cross-Examining the Expert Witness With
the Aid of Books, 41 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 192 (1950); Note, Medical Treatises as Evidence-
Helpful but too Strictly Limited, 29 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 255 (1960) ;Annot Use of Medical or
Other Scientific Treatises in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 60 AL.R.2d 77 (1958).
10. See supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Barks v. Herzberg, 206 A.2d 507 (Del. 1965) ; Eckleberry v. Kaiser Founda-
tion N. Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
948
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expert by the use of a treatise which he has specifically relied on, some also
allow it under more lenient circumstances. Thus there is authority for using
learned treatises in impeaching an expert when he has relied on treatises in
general, or particular treatises other than those used in cross-examination.'2 An
even more liberal view permits impeachment of an expert by the use of treatises
which he recognizes as authoritative whether or not he has relied on them in
forming his opinion.' 3 The broadest view allows authoritative treatises to be used
on cross-examination for the somewhat different purpose of testing the qualifica-
tions of an expert, whether or not he has relied on the treatises or recognized
them as authoritative.' 4 The effect of using treatises to this extent is practically
indistinguishable from using them as primary evidence. Finally, where learned
treatises are admissible as substantive evidence directly, there are of course no
restrictions on their use on cross-examination which would not apply equally to
an expert.' 5
The rule that learned treatises on subjects of inductive sciences are not
admissible as independent evidence of the truth of the statements contained
therein is deeply rooted in the common law and has stubbornly resisted change
despite general disfavor by prominent legal commentators and the drafters of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. They urge that such treatises, when properly
authenticated, be admitted as substantive evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule.10 As Wigmore points out, "the purpose and theory of the hearsay rule are
the key to the exceptions to it."'17 The problem which the court must analyze in
making an exception to the hearsay rule is whether to admit the hearsay or to
lose it, or the chance of getting equally competent evidence, altogether. Thus
before the possibility of making an exception arises, the necessity for admitting
the hearsay or else losing it altogether must be shown.' s The necessity for ad-
mitting learned treatises becomes apparent when it is realized that it may fre-
quently be impossible to find a qualified expert, i.e., one qualified by personal
experience to speak on the topic of the treatise, within the jurisdiction and even
when there is one available, the cost of obtaining his services would probably be
prohibitive.'0 The necessity is particularly acute in medical malpractice actions
where it is extremely difficult for the plaintiff to obtain an expert to testify on his
12. See, e.g., Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Briggs v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., 238
Minn. 472, 57 N.W.2d 572 (1953); Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Roveda v. Weiss, 11 A.D.2d 745, 204 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't 1960);
McComish v. De Soi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Iln. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Superior Ice & Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage
Service, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1960).
15. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(31), Official Comment, makes it clear that this is the
result of admitting learned treatises as independent evidence.
16. See McCormick § 296, 621; 6 Wigmore § 1691, 5; Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(31).
17. 5 Wigmore § 1420.
18. Id. § 1421.
19. 6 id. § 1691.
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behalf. 2° Presumably, however, no one would attempt to use hearsay evidence
unless there was a necessity for it and thus if necessity were the only requirement
for making an exception to the rule, all hearsay would be admissible. Therefore
there is another requirement imposed on the heresay to qualify it to be admitted
as an exception: the hearsay must be of the kind that makes the reason for
excluding it not so persuasive. The reason for excluding it being the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the author of the hearsay, it ceases to be so com-
pelling when the hearsay is surrounded by circumstances which give it a guaranty
of trustworthiness that is ordinarily acquired by cross-examining the author.2 1
There are several factors surrounding the writing and publishing of a learned
treatise which give it this circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness. Since a
treatise is not ordinarily written with a view toward litigation, the author has
no motive to misrepresent the subject matter in favor of either litigant. Further-
more a premium is placed on the accuracy and reliability of a scientific treatise
because the author's professional reputation is staked on the quality of his work.
Another check on the trustworthiness of a learned treatise is that a work which
is recognized as authoritative has necessarily survived rigorous cross-examination
within the author's own profession.
Similarly, persuasive arguments may be raised against the objections di-
rected at learned treatises apart from their hearsay nature. Just as an expert wit-
ness must explain his testimony so that a jury of laymen can understand it, so
can an expert be used to explain the technicalities of a learned treatise. And if the
courtroom is to become a "battle of the books," that certainly would be no worse
than the present battle of the experts.22 Furthermore, as Wigmore points out, the
objection that rapid medical progress will render medical treatises outdated ig-
nores the large body of long established medical knowledge and if carried to its
logical conclusion would prohibit any medical expert from testifying on a certain
topic unless he was familiar with all the latest advances. 23 Finally, Uniform Rule
of Evidence 66 offers a possible solution to the multiple hearsay problem by pro-
viding that a treatise properly within the exception of rule 63(31) is not inad-
missible because it contains a statement by someone other than the author if
such statement itself meets the requirements of the exception.
Despite the arguments for admitting learned treatises directly as an excep-
tion to th hearsay rule, Alabama and now Wisconsin are the only states which
have by judicial decision departed from the general rule of inadmissibility.2 4
20. For an insight to the pressures brought to bear upon a doctor who is called to
testify on behalf of the plaintiff in a malpractice action see Note, Malpractice and Medical
Testimony, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 333 (1963).
21. See 6 Wigmore § 1692.
22. For criticism of the abuses of modem expert testimony, see Morgan, Practical iD;-
culties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 725 (1961).
23. 6 Wigmore § 1690.
24. The Alabama rule was first enunciated in Stoudenmeler v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558
(1857), when the court said that "medical authors, whose books are admitted or proven to
be standard works with that profession, ought to be received in evidence." Id. at 567. Sec
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Several states have enacted statutes which on their face would seem to make
learned treatises admissible as substantive evidence, but by narrow judicial con-
struction such laws have been reduced to codifying the common law rule ad-
mitting works of exact sciences. 25 Massachusetts and Nevada have enacted stat-
utes which specifically allow medical treatises to be used as substantive evidence
in malpractice cases only. 26 In addition, three jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Rules of Evidence in toto and thus follow the rule adopted by the
court in the instant case.
27
In the instant case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed its long-standing
rule which excludes learned treatises as substantive evidence and admits them
on cross-examination only on the most restricted basis.28 At the same time, how-
ever, the court completely reversed this rule by adopting for future use rule
63 (31) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence which permits learned treatises, whose
authority is properly established, to be admitted in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule to prove the truth of the statements contained therein. Con-
sidering the abruptness of this reversal, it is somewhat surprising that the court
did little more than announce the new rule. None of the arguments for or against
using learned treatises as primary evidence are discussed. Nevertheless, the court,
without explicitly making the point, seems to indicate by several of its statements
that it recognized that learned treatises possess both qualifications for admitting
them as an exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., necessity and a circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness. Thus it apparently recognized the necessity for
admitting them when it noted the hardship the old rule had worked, particularly
also Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 268 So. 2d 6 (1953). Alabama has now codified its rule.
See infra note 25.
25. See, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 41.670 (1965) which provides that "Historical works,
books of science or art, and published maps or charts, when made by persons indifferent
between the parties, are primary evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest." See also
Ala. Cod tit. 7, § 413 (1960) ; Cal. Evid. Code § 1341 (West 1966) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 16-403
(1948); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.23 (1950); Mont. Rev. Code § 93-1101-8 (1947); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1218 (1943) ; Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-6 (1953). The courts have consistently held
that these statutes do not change the common law rule excluding learned treatises on subjects
of inductive sciences because the facts contained in such treatises are not of general notoriety
and interest. See, e.g., Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation N. Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d
1090 (1961).
26. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 79c (Supp. 1966); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1963).
These statutes recognize the particularly acute need for a substitute for expert medical testi-
mony in malpractice cases and abrogate the hearsay rule in this limited class of cases. See
supra note 20. For other examples of statutes specifically making learned treatises admissible
in a certain type of case, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 700j-801 (1958) (milk price hearings),
and S.C. Code Ann. § 26-142 (1962) (sanity hearings).
27. C.Z. Code § 2962(31) (1963); Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-459(cc) (1964); V.I.
Code tit. 5 § 932(31) (1957). The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted most of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence as rules of the court. N.J. Sup. Ct. § 63(31) (1965). See supra
note 3.
28. An argument can be made that the Guide should have been admitted under the
exception for "exact" sciences since it resembles a compilation of scientific data more than a
treatise of abstract medical theory, see supra notes 1, 4. The measurements of the Guide
however, fall far short of the accuracy and reproducibility of measurements of scientific
phenomena in the fields of chemistry and physics which have traditionally been admitted
under this exception.
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due to the difficulty of obtaining expert medical testimony.20 The court also
seemed to recognize the second qualification when pointing out that the scientific
process by which learned treatises are produced is at least as strong a guaranty
of trustworthiness as reliance upon the efficacy of an oath. 0 Whether or not
the court made these statements with the intention of demonstrating the requi-
site qualifications of treatises, in adopting the Uniform Rule it has put itself on
record as approving the reasoning which admits hearsay with these qualifications
into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
By the decision in the instant case, Wisconsin becomes only the second state
to admit learned treatises as substantive evidence in the absence of express
statutory authority.81 The possible reasons for the reluctance of the judiciary of
other states to carve out of the hearsay rule an exception for learned treatises
are twofold: either they are not convinced that learned treatises on subjects of
inductive sciences have attained that degree of trustworthiness which makes
cross-examination of the author dispensable, or they believe that the rule ex-
cluding learned treatises as substantive evidence has become so firmly fixed that
any change at this late date should be made by the legislature. The decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is defensible against attack by either of these lines
of reasoning. The wisdom of the rationale underlying the majority rule has been
put in doubt by the arguments of those who urge adoption of the contrary rule.82
And it should be no criticism of the court that it took the initiative to change its
longstanding rule without waiting for legislative acion. The admissibility of hear-
say has always been governed by judicially-created exceptions to the general
rule, and the fact that the exception created in this case happened to be provided
for in a proposed legislative act 38 does not imply any usurpation of law-making
power by the courts. While there is no doubt that the legislature has the power
to prescribe rules of evidence for the courts, in the absence of such action the
courts should be free to formulate their own rules and change them when a better
policy will be served by such a change.
The court's specific adoption of rule 63(31) is beneficial in two ways. By
this method, it is possible to salvage some of the best sections of the Uniform
Rule of Evidence whose enactment in the entirety by the legislature is jeopar-
dized by other less desirable sections. In addition, by adopting the Uniform Rule
the court has clearly defined the scope of its new rule. Under rule 63(31), once
the authority of the treatise is established, it may be used as direct evidence to
the same extent as an expert's testimony. Similarly, according to the official com-
ment to the section, all restrictions on the use of treatises on cross-examination
which would not apply equally to an expert have been lifted. The fact that the
29. Lewandowski v. Preferred Rik Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 76, 146 N.W.2d 505,
509 (1966).
30. Id. at 76-77, 146 N.W.2d at 509.
31. See supra note 24.
32. See supra note 16.
33. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(31).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been called on to interpret the new rule in any
subsequent case may attest to its clarity. The only question which may cause
difficulty is whether or not the judge should have any discretion to exclude a
treatise notwithstanding proper establishment of its authority. Wigmore's con-
ception of the better rule is to allow the judge this discretion in order to meet
exceptional circumstances 3 4
More importantly, the decision in the principal case is in line with the
primary goal of our judicial system-the fair, speedy and economical resolution
of disputes. Since we cannot expect an expert witness to testify from personal
experience on all subjects, we must allow him to base his opinion to some extent
on his study of the literature in his field. When this is realized, it would seem to
be in the interests of accuracy and impartiality to admit the literature itself
rather than depend upon the second-hand version of an interested-and com-
pensated-expert witness. It is also repugnant to the concept of due process that
a plaintiff should be denied recovery on a meritorious cause of action because of
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining expert medical testimony in a
malpractice case. Finally there is no reason why the cost of a law suit, which
can be inflated tremendously by the use of expert testimony, should be a drain
on a litigant's financial resources when equally competent and trustworthy evi-
dence is as near at hand as the library.
The rule adopted in the principal case is very similar to the one that has
been followed in Alabama since the middle of the nineteenth century3 5 If the
workability of the Uniform Rule can be measured by past experience with an
almost identical one, then it is significant to note that all the horrors surmised
to be attendant to adopting a rule admitting learned treatises as substantive
evidence have failed to materialize in practice 38 Many states which still follow
the majority rule have seriously undermined that rule by permitting liberal use
of treatises during cross-examination. 37 As a practical matter, the effect on the
jury of the almost unrestricted use of treatises in cross-examining an expert
witness for the ostensible purpose of impeaching his credibility or testing his
qualifications is indistinguishable from using treatises as independent, primary
evidence. In many instances this practice has become in fact a devious way of
"getting around" the hearsay rule excluding learned treatises 38 Presumably the
courts would not continue to condone such a subterfuge if they were determined
to give full effect to the hearsay rule. If the courts are not determined to give
full effect to the rule excluding learned treatises as substantive evidence, then
the judicially forthright action would be to change the rule to allow them to be
34. 6 Wigmore § 1691.
35. See supra note 24.
36. Over eighty years after the adoption of its rule, the Alabama Supreme Court said
"[w]e have not found the ends of justice defeated by our rule, nor the difficulties of its
application very great." City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 607, 188 S. 264, 266-67 (1939).
37. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
38. Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 455.
953
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
admitted directly rather than continuing to sanction the same result achieved
by less respectful means.
CHARLES SAWYER
TAXATION---'OERNIHT RULE" OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE IS VALID UNDER § 162(a) (2) OF INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
Respondent was a traveling salesman for a wholesale grocery company in
Tennessee. He lived in Fountain City, Tennessee, about 450 miles from his
employer's place of business. The respondent would customarily leave his
residence about 5 a.m. in order to be in his sales territory at the start of the
business day. He-ordinarily traveled a total of 150 to 175 miles daily, returning
home by 5:30 p.m. The respondent ate breakfast and lunch on the road in
customers' restaurants. On his income tax returns for 1960 and 1961 he deducted
the cost of these meals as traveling expenses "while away from home" under
section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction and the respondent paid the tax. Suing for a refund
in the District Court, the taxpayer received a verdict in his favor, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.2 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that the "sleep or rest" rule of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, allowing a deduction for the cost of
meals only when the taxpayer is away from home overnight, is valid under
section 162(a) (2). United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
The Revenue Act of 1918 allowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary
business expenses.3 At first, this provision was strictly construed as denying any
deduction for "traveling expenses" such as meals and lodging, unless these
expenses could be deemed within the "ordinary and necessary" language of the
Act.4 Later, however, taking a more liberal view, the Treasury Department
allowed a deduction of such traveling expenses "in excess of any expenditure
ordinarily required for such purposes at home." In a further liberalization
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(2) reads in part:
(a) In General: There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business;
2. 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
3. Rev. Act of 1918, § 214(a) (1), 40 Stat. 1066, reads in part:
(a) That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year in carrying on any trade or business ....
4. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1920 ed.).
5. T.D. 3101, 1920-3 Cum. Bull. 191.
